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Resumo. Uma questão básica ainda se coloca aos leitores do Hípias menor de Platão: 
como lidar com a conclusão final do diálogo, de que o homem bom pratica a injustiça 
voluntariamente, que parece profundamente inconciliável com o princípio atribuído a 
Sócrates de que “ninguém erra de propósito”. Contudo, se investigamos o texto mais de 
perto, encontramos indícios de que o posicionamento de Sócrates não é nem paradoxal 
nem contraditório com as posições filosóficas que ele estabelece nas outras obras de Pla-
tão. Ao contrário, o diálogo chega a uma conclusão definitiva. O homem justo se recusa 
a praticar a injustiça precisamente porque ele não deseja (βούλεσθαι) fazê-lo. O conheci-
mento do que é bom ou ruim (em outras palavras, do que favorece ou prejudica a alma) 
ativa exclusivamente o desejo pelo bem e, consequentemente, o poder de produzi-lo.
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The end of Hippias’ exhibition (ἘΠΊΔΕΊΞΊΣ) on Homer is followed by a 
philosophical gathering of a group of listeners who, having chosen Eud-
icus1 for their representative, urge Socrates to scrutinize and evaluate what 
has been said by putting Hippias’ speech to the test.2 Plato describes this 
group as being well acquainted with the Socratic elenchus, which aims at 
examining whether a speech has been well-spoken (καλῶς λέγειν) or not.3 
Thus, right from the beginning, the dialogue provides an appropriate occa-
sion for the demonstration and the subsequent criticism of Hippias’ exhibi-
tion speech having as its central idea the concepts of truth and falsehood. 
* Pós-Doutorando em Platão no Departamento de Classics da University of Ioannina.
** Artigo recebido em 4.set.2015 e aceito para publicação em 28.out.2015.
1  On the idea that Plato meant to give us a hint at the good (ἀγαθόν) and the just (δίκαιον) by 
choosing the name Εὔδικος, see Friedländer 1964, 145. Cf. Lampert 2002, 236 n. 12; Weiss 2006, 
147 n. 53.
2  ἢ καὶ ἐλέγχεις, εἴ τί σοι μὴ καλῶς δοκεῖ εἰρηκέναι, 363a3.
3  What should be noted is that the Socratic elenchus here, being in line with how it appears 
in other dialogues, forms the tool urging to determine or establish whether a certain reasoning 
is a good one (καλὸς λόγος) or not, namely whether it can withstand elenctic pressure, eventually 
not being refuted as false opinion (ψευδὴς δόξα). For Plato’s presentation of the customary elenctic 
Socrates in the Lesser Hippias, with special emphasis on his elaboration on the various aspects of 
the philosophical persona of his master, see Blondell 2002, 113 ff.
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Blundell (1992, 134–5) holds that the dialogue is “a portrayal of the fruits of 
the traditional forms of education and their sophistic heirs”. Plato himself, 
she continues, follows “the educational traditions of his culture by using 
archetypal heroes to examine aspects of moral and intellectual character”.4 
Therefore, the arguments of the Lesser Hippias should be seen as part of a 
larger pedagogical strategy, in which Socrates challenges both traditional 
and sophistic educational methods. Following the same line of thought, 
Kahn (1996, 114) notes that a strong background theme for the Lesser Hip-
pias, as for the Ion, is the role of poetry in education. The aim of this paper 
is twofold: first, to offer a new interpretation of the dialogue which aims to 
do justice to the dialogue itself not only by seeking to defend and restore 
the value of the arguments unfolded in it, but also by attempting to show 
how these arguments are employed by Plato for a larger pedagogical and 
philosophical purpose; second, to illustrate, through this interpretation, 
the criticism Plato levels against traditional forms of education, values and 
their moral standards, with a view to justifying the philosophical life as the 
best way of life for a human being.
INITIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TRUE MAN (ἈΛΗΘΗΣ  
ἈΝΗΡ) AND THE FALSE MAN (ΨΕΥΔΗΣ ἈΝΗΡ) (363a6–365d)
Hippias’ exhibition on poetry in general, but especially on Homer’s 
poetry,5 gives rise to the Socratic elenchus, which aims to test his expertise 
in discoursing upon these issues. Besides, Plato’s Ion (531e–532a) teaches 
us that possessing a craft implies being able to discern who speaks well 
and badly about its subject matter. Socrates’ reference to the superiority 
of the Iliad over the Odyssey, to just the extent that Achilles is a better man 
(ἀμείνων) than Odysseus,6 aims at examining (ἔλεγχος) Hippias’ expertise. 
Blundell (1992, 140) notes that “Hippias’ expertise in the evaluation of Ho-
meric characters, together with his status as a moral teacher and his desire 
for popular approval, makes him a fitting representative of traditional 
4  Cf. also Pottenger 1995, 45; Blondell 2002, 114.
5  ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου, 363c2–3. Blundell (1992, 137) considers 
Hippias as a voice of conventional, common-sense values. Cf. also Ovink 1931, 136; Kahn 1996, 
115, 118; Allen 1996, 28; Blondell 2002, 130, 136; Weiss 2006, 146.
6  ἤκουον ὅτι ἡ Ἰλιὰς κάλλιον εἴη ποίημα […] ἢ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, τοσούτῳ δὲ κάλλιον, ὅσῳ ἀμείνων Ἀχιλλεὺς 
Ὀδυσσέως, 363b2–4. Blundell (1992, 140) observes that “the moralizing attitude towards literature 
reflects the widespread belief that literary characters influence the audience through imitation 
resulting from emotional identification”. Cf. also Blondell 2002, 115.
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moral standards and their dissemination through the study of Homer”.7 
Through its representative, Homeric ethics becomes the target of Plato’s 
criticism. The end of Socrates’ dialectic will demonstrate whether an ex-
hibition (ἐπίδειξις) of this sort is accompanied by knowledge or seeming 
wisdom.8 Therefore, the major question raised concerns the comparison 
between Achilles and Odysseus and its evaluation, for which the most 
suitable is the expert in Homer’s poetry.9
 Hippias begins with a brief characterization of Achilles, Nestor and 
Odysseus, stressing that Homer depicts them as “the best man” (ἄριστος), 
“the wisest” (σοφώτατος) and “the wiliest” (πολυτροπώτατος) respectively 
(364c5–7).10 It is the last part of Hippias’ characterization, his use of the word 
πολυτροπώτατος to refer to Odysseus, that calls forth one of Socrates’ main 
objections: Achilles is also described as “wily” by Homer.
The Socratic objection provokes Hippias to limit the semantic corre-
lations of the word πολύτροπος (wily man), making its use and interpretation 
even clearer. The use of the Homeric intertext, based on which Achilles’ 
most honest (ἁπλούστατος) and true (ἀληθέστατος) character is highlighted,11 
aims at the exclusion of the characterisation πολύτροπος for Achilles.12 
7  Cf. also Ovink 1931, 145 ff; Blondell 2002, 118–9, 128.
8  The very term ἐπίδειξις is a Platonic hint at seeming (δοκεῖν)-wisdom, in which the sophists 
seem to be more interested, cf. also Blondell 2002, 130.
9  Plato’s irony is situated in both Socrates’ repeated admiration of Hippias’ expertise (οὕτως 
εὔελπις ὢν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν ἀφικνῇ εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, 364a2–3; ἀφόβως τε καὶ πιστευτικῶς […] τῇ 
διανοίᾳ, 364a4–6; τῆς σοφίας ἀνάθημα τὴν δόξαν εἶναι τὴν σὴν […], 364b2), as well as in the latter’s 
presumptuous display of his own superiority in wisdom (oὐδενὶ πώποτε κρείττονι εἰς οὐδὲν ἐμαυτοῦ 
ἐνέτυχον, 364a8). By contrast, this very irony foreshadows his lack of wisdom that will be 
eventually disclosed. For the irony of the passage, cf. Blundell 1992, 138 n. 31.
10  Scholars have been divided into two groups as to whether the dialogue contains equivocation 
or not. Sprague (1962, 67–8, 74, 75–6), on the one hand, stresses that large parts of the argument 
of Plato’s Lesser Hippias turn on the equivocal use of terms such as “wiliness”, “power”, “good”, 
“voluntary”, cf. Hoerber 1962; Mulhern 1968; Klosko 1987, 622 ff.; Zembaty 1989, 58–61. On the 
other hand, Weiss 1981, 288 n. 5 and passim does not believe that the dialogue must be charged 
with equivocation, cf. O’Brien 1967, 100 n. 11. I am generally inclined to support Weiss’s view, but 
I cannot elaborate this point further in this paper.
11  χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν […] ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὅμως Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν,/ ὅς χ’ ἕτερον 
μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ, 365a2–b1. When Hippias quotes Achilles’ words to Odysseus at 
Il. 9.308–13, he omits 311 and slightly alters 310 and 314. Labarbe (1949, 51–2) holds that the 
variations of the text reflect a 4th-cent. text of Homer: “Reste la première hypothèse: Platon ne 
connaissait pas le vers. Elle a de sérieuses chances d’être correcte”. However, Phillips (1987, 23) 
claims that these variations misrepresent the intention of the Homeric Achilles, while Blundell 
(1992, 144 n. 60) agrees with Brennan’s suggestion (1987, 24–5) that they show the weakness of 
Hippias’ memory and serve to lay greater stress on intentional action.
12  Hoerber (1962, 124–5) notes that the word πολύτροπος is the adjective Homer employs to 
describe Odysseus in the first line of the Odyssey (cf. Od. 10.330), where it means “much-travelled”, 
“much-wandering”. However, the scholar observes that the adjective may be ambiguous, in that 
it appears in Greek literature also in the sense of “crafty, shifty, clever, versatile”, cf. O’Brien 
1967, 97; Blundell 1992, 144; Lampert 2002, 232 n. 2. Hoerber concludes that it is the latter 
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 According to the sophist’s opinion, πολύτροπος is directly correlated with 
false man (ψευδής) and constitutes a main characteristic of Odysseus’.13 On 
the contrary, Achilles is presented as the model of true and honest man.14 
Combining Hippias’ previous argument, based on which Achilles is a 
character shaped by Homer in order to become the model of the best man 
(ἄριστος ἀνήρ, 364 c5), one can conclude that, for the sophist, truth and hon-
esty are integral parts of the term “good man”, thus certifying the place-
ment of the textual terms in the following uniform equation basis: the best 
man = the most true and honest. For the needs of his dialectic, Socrates 
clarifies the proposed semantic correlation between πολύτροπος and ψευδής, 
at the same time highlighting the definite disjunction suggested by Hip-
pias’ interpretation of Homer’s poetic craftsmanship: namely that between 
the true man (ἀληθής) and the false man (ψευδής).15
THE SAME MAN IS BOTH TRUE AND FALSE (365d-369b)
The Socratic elenchus underscores their inability to verify the real 
plan lying behind the composition of the Homeric epics.16 Therefore, he 
places Hippias in the position of the Homeric representative and brings 
the opinion to which the sophist arrived (about the disjunction between 
the true man and the false) to the forefront of his elenchus, attempting to 
meaning which the versatile Hippias assumes for πολύτροπος, by equating πολύτροπος with ψευδὴς 
(365b). Moreover, Weiss (1981, 289) does not accept Muhlern’s suggestion (1968, 283–8) that 
the word τρόπος contained in πολύτροπος signifies the typical behaviour of a person, the way he 
is, his character. She stresses that although it contains the word τρόπος, πολύτροπος is itself not 
a tropos-term but rather a dunamis-term; “it does not signify a person’s typical behaviour but 
rather an ability or capacity to behave a certain way”. For an elaborate discussion of the idea that 
Antisthenes is one of Plato’s targets here, see e.g. Raeder 1905, 57; Kahn 1996, 121 ff.
13  Vlastos (1991, 276) claims that though ψευδὴς can mean “liar” and does so in many contexts, 
it need not-it does not always do so. For example (at 276 n. 130), a false statement need not be a 
lying one, i.e. intended to be thought true, or a person making false statements need not intend 
them to be thought true. He therefore concludes that “throughout the dialogue Socrates uses 
ψευδὴς to mean not someone whose character it is to speak falsehoods but only someone who has 
the ability to do so if he so chooses”. Vlastos’s proposal aims to prove that Socrates is absolved of 
any intention to deceive. For Blundell (1992, 144), however, it is clear from the Homeric quotation 
that Hippias does mean to characterise Odysseus as a liar.
14   Ἥκιστά γε […] ἀλλ’ ἁπλούστατος καὶ ἀληθέστατος, 364e7–8; ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἴη ἀληθής τε καὶ 
ἁπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ ψευδής, 365b4–5. Weiss (2006, 125) notes that the word 
ἁπλοῦς has a range of meaning as broad as that of πολύτροπος: it is often translated “simple”, but it 
can be taken to mean “either something like ‘hapless’, the opposite of πολύτροπος as ‘resourceful’, 
or something like ‘artless’, the opposite of πολύτροπος as ‘wily’”. Cf. Ovink 1931, 149.
15  Ἐδόκει […] Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερος μὲν εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀληθής, ἕτερος δὲ ψευδής, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός, 365c3–4. 
16  ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη, 365d1. Cf. Ion 530c-d; Protagoras 347e; 
Friedländer 1964, 137; Blundell 1992, 145.
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extract at a first stage the definition that the sophist has to propose for the 
false man (ψευδής). It is particularly interesting to record the steps of the 
Socratic inductive reasoning by focusing on Hippias’ admissions.
1st part of the reasoning (H)
Hippias’ admissions:
H1. False men are able (δυνατοί) – among others – to deceive people (365d7–8).
H2. False men are powerful and – based on his previous admission – wily 
(πολύτροποι) (365e1–2).
H3. False men are powerful and wily due to cunning and some kind of in-
telligence (φρόνησις) (365e2–5). In this way, Hippias attributes some kind 
of intelligence to wily men.17
H4. False men, as intelligent (φρόνιμοι), know the content of their actions 
and, for these reasons, they do ill (κακουργοῦσι) (365e5–9). It is worth not-
ing that this idea recalls Crito 44d6, where those that are capable of the 
greatest evil (τὰ μέγιστα κακά) are also capable of the greatest good (ἀγαθὰ 
τὰ μέγιστα) (44d6–8).
H5. False men, as men who know the content of their actions and choose to 
do ill, namely to deceive, are wise (σοφοί) in deception, wise in doing ill 
(365e9–11).
From the first part of the reasoning (H), Socrates draws the follow-
ing conclusion: false men are powerful (δυνατοί) and intelligent (φρόνιμοι), 
knowing (ἐπιστήμονες) and wise (σοφοί) in those things in which they are 
false (366a2–4).
2nd part of the reasoning (Ha) 
Hippias’ admissions:
Ha1. (Already from section I) False men and true are not identical: there-
fore, they are different and quite opposite from each other (366a5–6, cf. 
365c3–4). This opinion involves – from this initial admission of Ha1 – 
17  Weiss 1981, 292 argues that “the difference between the positions of Socrates and Hippias 
is not the difference between tropos-concepts and dunamis-concepts, between terms indicating 
typical behaviour and terms indicating skill, but rather the difference between two kinds of 
dunamis-concept, one of which is neutral and the other of which is negative”. Thus, she concludes 
that by introducing ψευδὴς as a synonym for πολύτροπος, Hippias was not substituting a tropos-
adjective for a dunamis-adjective; instead, he was supplying the δύναμις of ὁ ψευδὴς with a particular 
content, a content which he thought negatively coloured the δύναμις itself.
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that true men are neither powerful nor intelligent nor knowing nor wise 
in those things in which they are true.
Ha2. Clarifying the conclusion of H and with the aid of Ha1: the idea that 
false men, separated from true men, are powerful and wise in those 
things in which they are false, involves that, if they wish, they are able 
to be false. At this point, an alternative verb-expression is used instead 
of “to be able to deceive” (δυνατοὶ ἐξαπατᾶν), which he used previously at a 
parallel equation with “to do ill” (κακουργεῖν). The expression “to be able 
to speak falsely” (δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι) combined with the notion of “will” 
(βούλησις) forms the expression “to be able, if they wish, to speak falsely” 
(λέγεις δυνατoὺς εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι ἐὰν βούλωνται, 366b2–3). In his interpreta-
tion, Hippias equates the terms “able, powerful” (δυνατοί) and “wise” 
(σοφοί), placing particular emphasis on δύναμις and not on σοφία.
From the second part of the reasoning (Ha), Socrates draws the fol-
lowing conclusion: the false are those who are wise and powerful in respect 
to speaking falsely (366b4–5).18 The reversal of terms, from δυνατοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ 
(366a7, 366b1) to σοφοί τε καὶ δυνατοὶ (366b5), highlights the fundamental So-
cratic attitude towards knowledge. While, for Hippias, the main charac-
teristic of ψευδὴς is the ability (δύναμις), whenever he wishes, to handle the 
knowledge of speaking falsely with the aim of speaking falsely (δυνατοὶ καὶ 
σοφοὶ ψεύδεσθαι), for Socrates, the knowledge of speaking falsely defines the 
ability to speak falsely (σοφοὶ καὶ δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι): knowledge makes some-
one powerful, capable of performing specific actions. However, the reversal 
of the above terms requires the definition of δυνατός, so that the semantic 
background of the δύναμις defined by the knowledge of speaking falsely can 
be specified. In this way, Socrates reaches, together with Hippias, the defini-
tion of δυνατός.
Δυνατὸς is someone that can do what he wishes when he wishes19; 
therefore, δύναμις is the power of doing what one wishes when one wishes. 
Socrates recalls Ha2 (ψευδεῖς = λέγεις δυνατoὺς εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι ἐὰν βούλωνται) 
and the use of the verb “wish” (βούλομαι) by Hippias. However, the two 
interlocutors interpret the definition of δυνατὸς in different ways with very 
18  Mulhern (1968, 286) observes that ψευδὴς is reduced from the status of a tropos-adjective to 
that of a mere dunamis-adjective at 366b4–5. Weiss (1981, 289), however, goes further in saying 
that from that point on, the dialogue gives not the slightest indication that Socrates in any way 
regrets this. Unlike Mulhern, she claims that Socrates ceases to ask questions of definitions and 
proceeds immediately to employ the dunamis-sense of ψευδὴς in his illustrations. Based on this 
reasoning, the conclusion retains the dunamis-sense of ἀληθὴς and ψευδής: the man skilled at 
speaking truthfully and the man skilled at speaking falsely are the same man. Thus the paradox 
vanishes, cf. Hoerber 1962, 126.
19  Δυνατὸς δέ γ’ ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἄρα, ὃς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται, ὅταν βούληται, 366b7–c1.
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different ideological nuances: understanding will (βούλησις) as a precondi-
tion of δύναμις (whenever I wish to speak falsely, or, in general, to do what I 
wish, I can use the necessary cognitive means and do it), Hippias highlights 
his faith in the manipulation of knowledge (σοφία) with the only goal of 
δύναμις. On the other hand, applying the definition of δυνατὸς in the care-
fully placed and suggestively presented Socratic opinion, one can note that, 
for Socrates, the knowledge (σοφία) of speaking falsely, which defines the 
ability (δύναμις) to speak falsely, finally defines the ability to perform the 
false speaking, or, in general, to do what one wishes whenever he wishes.20 
Essentially, the real question that has been raised by now from the discus-
sion is the following: if my will (βούλησις) defines my ability (δύναμις) (which 
both interlocutors seem to accept), what factor defines the will? The Socratic 
reply lies at the heart of the dialogue: knowledge (σοφία) predetermines the 
will (βούλησις) and, therefore, the ability (δύναμις) to do something, which 
refers to the wider philosophical question of whether I know what I really 
wish and what benefits me (prudential benefit),21 namely a matter of virtue 
evaluation. The passage portrays most vigorously the distance that sepa-
rates the two interlocutors, a distance created by two semantically different 
approaches to the terms σοφία, βούλησις and δύναμις and the relationships 
among them, which are attributed to two diametrically opposed assess-
ments of the virtues that one must set as a priority in their lives: for Hip-
pias, the will to achieve false speaking originates from the assessment of 
(the deed and) the outcome of the deed of false speaking as good, and acti-
vates the ability to do this through the proper conception and treatment of 
the cognitive means necessary to achieve this goal.22 However, the reversal 
of terms attempted by Socrates redefines the functional value and prioriti-
sation of knowledge (σοφία) in human life. For Socrates, the will (βούλησις) to 
achieve false speaking originates from the knowledge that the deed of false 
speaking is going to produce good23: the reasonable – based on knowledge 
– assessment of performing a good thing is going to activate the ability 
for its performance. What is suggested in the passage is that the previous 
identification of the terms “deceive” (ἐξαπατᾶν), “speak falsely” (ψεύδεσθαι) 
and “do ill” (κακουργοῦσι), as well as the special meaning they take under 
the light of their examination as identical terms, lead to the conclusion that 
20  But does anyone wish to speak falsely (ψεύδεσθαι) or to do ill (κακουργεῖν)?
21  Cf. Vlastos 1991, 279 ff.; Kahn 1996, 117.
22  Socrates correlates will (βούλησις) with knowledge (σοφία), approaching differently the 
former and the latter, while Hippias understands knowledge under different terms.
23  This highlights the principle attributed to Socrates that no one errs willingly (ἑκών): one acts 
ἑκὼν when he knows that what he does produces a good outcome.
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the actions these verbs describe cannot constitute the object of someone’s 
will (since this is prohibited by his σοφία), so that they can be transformed 
into ability to perform the respective deed. For Hippias, σοφία is a set of in-
dividual cognitive means and methods, which are defined by the strict and 
indiscriminate application of the relationship between will (βούλησις) and 
ability (δύναμις); on the other hand, for Socrates, it is directly related to the 
wider issue of the knowledge of good and evil.
The above differentiation of terms and meanings is going to become 
clearer through the third part of the reasoning, in which Socrates resorts to 
one of the most typical features of his elenchus, namely that of craft anal-
ogy: for the needs of the reasoning, he re-introduces the term ἄριστος (the 
best man), which Hippias himself used at the beginning of the dialogue 
(364c5), attributing truth and honesty to it as necessary features (365b4). 
In this way, he aims to unite knowledge (σοφία) with virtue (ἀρετή). One 
should recall here that Hippias originally (364c5–7) attributed three dif-
ferent characteristics, ἄριστος (the best man), σοφώτατος (the wisest) and 
πολυτροπώτατος (the wiliest), to three characters, Achilles, Nestor and Odys-
seus respectively: Socrates’ aim is to show that these three characteristics 
can essentially stem only from one person. The true man (ἀληθής) and the 
false (ψευδής) are actually the same: the good man (ἀγαθός), and the good 
man is the wise man (σοφός).
3rd part of the reasoning (Hb)
Hippias’ admissions:
Hb1. Hippias’ experience in the art of calculating (λογιστική) makes him able 
(δυνατός), if he wishes (βούλησις), to tell the truth about it, without any 
intention to deceive, giving the correct answer in matters of calculation, 
faster and more effectively than anyone (speed of response, effective-
ness, success, 366c5–d). In other words, the cognitive, fast and effective 
performance of the deed related to the particular art is linked to the 
truth and unavoidably leads to success. In this way, the union of knowl-
edge (σοφία) with effectiveness and truth is achieved.
Hb2. The reason why Hippias gives the correct-true answer in calculation is-
sues faster than anyone is because he outmatches everyone with regard 
to his ability (δύναμις) and knowledge (σοφία) in the sector of calculating.
Hb3. Being most able/powerful (δυνατώτατος) and wisest (σοφώτατος) in a 
particular art entails being also best (ἄριστος) in this art (366d2 ff.). What 
should be noted is that Plato has Socrates repeat (366d3) the reversal of 
terms he suggested above, a reversal that again eludes the sophist’s at-
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tention: unaware that he could be walking into a verbal trap, Hippias in 
reality consents to the conclusion “the one who is wisest and most pow-
erful in a particular art is also best in this art, most able to tell the truth 
about matters related to this art”, while he has apparently consented 
to the view “the one who is most powerful and wisest in a particular 
art is also best in this art, most able to tell the truth about matters re-
lated to this art”. The careful study of the text shows that the reversal 
of terms does not change the outcome of the reasoning: however, based 
on the aforementioned unfolding of my reasoning, the reversal aims at 
presenting Socrates’ attempt to place knowledge (σοφία) in the centre of 
interest. In this way, he seeks to achieve the union of knowledge with 
virtue (ἀρετή) and establish the idea “virtue is knowledge”. He also dic-
tates the opinion that ignorance is evil.
Hb4. The validity of the opinion that “the one who is wisest and most pow-
erful in a particular art is also best in this art, most able to tell the truth 
about matters related to this craft” raises the issue of who is most able 
to tell falsehoods about it.
Hb5. Only the wise man (σοφός) in respect to calculation is able24 to express, 
if he wishes (the precondition is that he wishes), an erroneous opinion 
by speaking falsely (ψεύδεσθαι) in matters of calculation; the ignorant of 
calculation is actually weak (366e3–367 a5).
From the third part of the reasoning (Hb), Socrates draws the fol-
lowing conclusion: Hippias, as wise (σοφός) in calculating (λογιστική), was 
proven to represent in the same person the one who is most able (δυνατώτατος) 
to speak truly and falsely about calculations; and this person, as he stressed 
24  It is worth noting the use of the potential optative in the passage, combined with the 
conditional participle βουλόμενος. The conditional element in βουλόμενος essentially raises the 
question: can anyone ever wish (βούλησις) what is bad? At first glance, the answer seems positive: 
only if he has no knowledge, because knowledge pushes us towards what is good, while ignorance 
towards what is bad. However, Gorgias 466a-468d teaches us that humans wish (βούλησις) the 
things that are good. Thus all voluntary action is aimed at the presumed good of the agent. On 
the contrary, involuntary actions are those which result in harm for the agent; in such cases, 
one does not do whatever he wishes (βούλησις), but only whatever seems good to him (δόξα). But 
here another question arises: should we resort to Gorgias’ teachings in order to interpret Plato’s 
elaboration on the notion of βούλησις in the Lesser Hippias? The answer is partly yes, partly no. 
Undoubtedly, the distinction between doing what I wish and doing what seems good to me plays 
a dominant role in the Gorgias. However, bearing this distinction in mind, one can observe that 
it is not elaborated here in any detail. In fact, Plato allows the ignorant to wish (βούλησις) to tell 
falsehoods (367a2). As we shall see, Plato’s treatment of βούλησις in the Lesser Hippias, though 
probably an earlier one than that of the Gorgias, is closely akin to it. At any rate, as is evident from 
what has been deduced from the text, a necessary condition for not wishing bad things is the 
attempt to acquire the knowledge of good. The craft analogy aims to show that what applies to 
the field of crafts can also apply to the field of ethics.
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above (Hb3), is the one who is good (ἀγαθός) in respect to calculations. Con-
sequently, being wise in calculations entails being good at them, namely 
most able to speak truly and falsely about them. This leads naturally to the 
identification of knowledge (σοφία) with virtue (ἀρετή); Socrates establishes 
the dominance of σοφία.
As a result, the same man is both true (ἀληθής) and false (ψευδής), so 
that an evaluative type of comparison (ἀμείνων) between the two cannot 
take place.25 The application of this principle in all sciences (ἐπιστῆμαι) and 
crafts (τέχναι)26 proves that it has virtually the same validity27: the one who is 
wise (σοφός) in a particular craft, namely good (ἀγαθός) at it, is able (δυνατός) 
to speak both truly and falsely about matters related to it; but the ignorant 
(ἀμαθής) of a craft is actually bad (κακός)28 at it and unable to speak both truth 
and falsehood about it, unable to be both true and false. This view dictates 
that, even when the ignorant man wishes (βούλησις) to speak one way or 
the other, he is unable to achieve what he wishes due to lack of knowledge. 
Wishing to speak falsely, he quite often involuntarily (ἄκων) tells the truth 
by accident, due to ignorance (cf. 367a2–3). By contrast, the wise man is 
always able to speak both truly and falsely, namely to voluntarily (ἑκών) 
achieve what he wishes when he wishes, through knowledge. This means 
that knowledge activates ability, power (δύναμις); but ignorance does not ac-
tivate ability, even if it has managed to mislead the will (βούλησις). But what 
does misleading the will mean? It involves lacking the guidance of knowl-
edge, and thereby lacking the ability to exercise reasonable judgement in 
evaluating some things as good. Therefore, two levels of βούλησις emerge: 
(a) the one that has been defined by knowledge and activates ability; in 
other words, the one that has been defined by knowledge always leads to 
the production of a good result, (b) the one that has been influenced by 
25  In this way, Hippias’ original argument, according to which Achilles is better than Odysseus 
under the criterion of truth and honesty, is invalidated.
26  Socrates’ conversation with Hippias contributes to this, since the latter is “the wisest of 
men in the largest number of arts” (πλείστας τέχνας πάντων σοφώτατος […] ἀνθρώπων, 368b2–3) and 
“surpasses the rest in knowledge […]” (ἐπιστήμων […] διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων, 368d3–4). As regards 
Hippias’ “much-learning” (πολυμαθία), Hoerber (1962, 124), after recording Plato’s negative 
judgment on πολυμαθία in Phaedrus 275a-b and Laws 811b, 819a, goes on to say that “to Plato 
excessive versatility is conducive to confusion. It is no wonder, then, that in the Lesser Hippias 
[…] one of the main threads which runs throughout the treatise is confusion”. Blondell (2002, 
142), however, claims that Socrates here “implies that breadth of knowledge has its own value, if 
properly used and placed within the hierarchy of values established by dialectic”.
27  It is worth noting that in passage 368e5–369a1 (ἐν ᾗτινι βούλει σοφίᾳ τοῦτο σκέψαι ἢ πανουργίᾳ 
ἢ ὁτιοῦν χαίρεις ὀνομάζων: “examine this in any sort of wisdom you wish – or in any cunning or 
whatever name you like”), the terms σοφία and πανουργία appearing to be used interchangeably 
recall the earlier connection suggested by Hippias between πολύτροπος and πανοῦργος, thus 
pointing to the identification of the true man with the false.
28  Essentially, he implies that he is bad (κακός) at it because he is ignorant of it.
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ignorance (unreflective acceptance of some things as good), which finally 
results in weakness.29 Linking knowledge to virtue, Socrates argues that the 
only way for someone to be effective and powerful is knowledge. The iden-
tification of virtue with knowledge, and the activation of ability in the field 
of sciences-crafts lead to the formation of an unavoidable logical necessity 
that safely brings about the wished-for good outcome.
29  Friedländer (1964, 140) stresses that Gorgias 466dff. clarifies the distinction between genuine 
willing and arbitrary inclination (βούλομαι-δοκεῖ μοι): a true act of the will always aims at the 
good (cf. O’Brien 1967, 105 n. 15). Following this line of thought, the scholar concludes that 
only Socratic deception “willing” the good is power. Eventually, Hippias’ claim cannot be valid 
any longer; the same person is both true and false. Blundell (1992, 146) says that in Metaphysics 
Δ.29.1025a6–13, Aristotle criticizes this argument as fallacious, especially for its equivocation on 
ψευδὴς as a capacity and as a disposition which gives rise to intentional action. She concludes (at 
152) that the confusion of capacity with disposition serves to conflate Hippias with the figure 
of Odysseus. Generally speaking, Friedländer (1964, 139) observes that Hippias and Socrates 
mean quite different things by the word ψευδής: Hippias means a false person deriving pleasure 
or advantage from his deception, while Socrates “means a person who deceives in a specific 
situation but can just as well tell the truth, and who, as a man of knowledge, will use the one or 
the other as a means to achieve his end, ‘the good’”. For Muhlern (1968, 286), the paradoxical 
conclusion that “the same man is both true and false” “depends throughout upon the failure to 
dissociate δύναμις-concepts from τρόπος-concepts. In each of the cases of technical knowledge, 
the δύναμις supposed to be conferred by its appropriate σοφία – arithmetical, geometrical, or 
astronomical – is taken at one time for a δύναμις, at the next for a τρόπος”. Against those who 
charge the Lesser Hippias with patent equivocation and abuses of language (see, for example, 
Hoerber 1962, Sprague 1962, Muhlern 1968), Weiss (1981, 288, 288 n. 6, 290) attempts to defend 
both the validity of the argument and the truth of the conclusion by claiming that the argument 
contains only dunamis-terms (cf. also Weiss 2006, 121–4, 129–30, 137–8). Thus neither Socrates 
nor Hippias is to be accused of equivocation. Waterfield (1987, 270) criticises Weiss’s account 
of the validity of the argument and goes further in saying that if the present argument had 
been couched entirely in terms of ability, then the conclusion would be that the person with the 
ability to lie is better than the person who is unable to lie. But “the conclusion is meant to be 
more radical than that: it is that someone who deliberately exercises his talent for deceit is better 
than one who does not” (cf. Zembaty 1989, 52–8). Such regular deceit is something as immoral 
and unacceptable as the final conclusion of the dialogue. Waterfield concludes that Hippias’ 
disapproving attitude towards deceit “reflects not just common Greek morality, but Plato’s views 
too; the conclusion is unacceptable all round”. Skouteropoulos (1995, 20) notes that, from this 
point on (namely, the point of identification of the true man with the false), the two terms, ἀληθὴς 
and ψευδής, are signified in two ways: ἀληθὴς sometimes signifies the truthful, straight, honest 
man (Α1) and, other times, the man whose decisions reflect the way things are (person speaking 
the truth) (Α2); on the other hand, ψευδὴς sometimes signifies the untruthful and dishonest man 
(Ψ1) and, other times, the man whose decisions are not identified with the truth (Ψ2). The scholar 
believes that each of them uses the terms differently: Hippias points to Α1 and Ψ1, which define 
an ethical parameter, forming the pair “honest-dishonest”, which has ethical connotations, while 
Socrates points to Α2–Ψ2 which has a basically intellectualistic parameter and mainly ethically 
indifferent, forming the ethically indifferent pair “speaking the truth-not speaking the truth”. 
Finally, Kahn (1996, 115) follows those who suggested that the fallacy of the argument is located 
in the move from is able to lie to is a liar. He claims that Hippias “has been deceived by Socrates’ 
repeated claim that the capacity to lie is a necessary condition for being a liar (366b, 367b2–5); he 
is thus led to suppose that it must be a sufficient condition as well”. Kahn adds (at 116) that Plato 
is aware of the fallacy here; in fact, he repeatedly alludes to the idea that “to be a liar requires not 
only the capacity to lie but also the will, desire, or intention to do so”. The scholar stresses that in 
Aristotelian terms “the fallacy lies in collapsing the distinction between an open capacity like art 
or science (a dunamis, techne¯, or episte¯me¯) and a fixed disposition or character trait (hexis)”.
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INTERLUDE: DIALECTIC AND LITERATURE (369b–373c).  
THE MEANING OF  ἙΚΩΝ IN RELATION TO WILL
The identification of ἀληθὴς with ψευδὴς directly affects Hippias’ at-
tempt to comparatively define Achilles’ and Odysseus’ goodness (ἀμείνω, 
363b3–4, 364c5, 365b4). The comparison falls apart due to the fact that it is 
based on two features that were proven identical. However, Hippias’ stub-
bornness together with his effort to confirm his poetic specialisation out-
flank the conclusion of the reasoning and are tossed as a powerful attempt 
to restore his speech with the aim of establishing it as the “best speech” 
(369c7–8). Therefore, his reasoning follows the following stages:
Central thesis: Homer made Achilles better (ἀμείνων) than Odysseus and 
without falsehood (ἀψευδής), but Odysseus deceitful (δολερός), a teller 
of many falsehoods (πολλὰ ψευδόμενος), and worse (χείρων) than Achilles 
(369c3–5).
 i. He rebukes Socrates’ attempt to interpret Homer in a way that suits him 
best in order to establish the view that Achilles performs actions that 
are not consistent with his words. Specifically, the disagreement between 
words and deeds30 Socrates refers to concerns the fact that, while Achilles 
advertises his departure, he does not prepare it, thus putting the truth of 
his words at risk (cf. 370d5–6). Before the challenge raised by the Socratic 
question about how the degree of goodness of both Achilles and Socrates 
is to be defined,31 Hippias introduces the concepts of “purposefulness” 
(or, by extension, “treachery”, ἐπιβουλή) and “voluntariness” (ἑκών) in 
relation to speaking falsely (ψεύδεσθαι), aiming at the differentiation of 
speaking falsely in the case of the two characters: Achilles speaks falsely 
not on purpose (ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς) but involuntarily (ἄκων), forced by the mis-
fortune of the army to stay; on the contrary, Odysseus speaks falsely 
willingly (ἑκών) and by design (ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς) (370e5–9).
 ii. Socrates’ objection stems from the contradictory content of the words 
Achilles addresses to Odysseus, to whom he talks about his departure, 
30  Cf. Blondell 2002, 130.
31  ἀπορῶν ὁπότερος τούτοιν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἀμείνων πεποίηται τῷ ποιητῇ, καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀμφοτέρω ἀρίστω 
εἶναι καὶ δύσκριτον ὁπότερος ἀμείνων εἴη καὶ περὶ ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ 
καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο παραπλησίω ἐστόν, 370d7–e4 (“because I am perplexed as to which of the two men is 
portrayed as better by the poet, and because I believe both are extremely good, and it is hard to 
decide which of the two is better, concerning falsehood and truth and the rest of virtue; for both 
men are in fact nearly equal in this matter”). Hobbs (2000, 195 ff.) bases her interpretation on this 
passage. She suggests that for Socrates, Achilles and Odysseus represent two different types of 
heroism and andreia: each hero (at 198) “embodies a particular version of andreia which requires 
considerable purification if it is to be of use to Plato’s educational project”.
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and to Ajax, to whom he talks about his stay. From this point of view, 
Achilles has bad intentions, a treacherous goal and a carefully prepared 
plan to deceive, a plan which is superior to that of Odysseus’: Homer 
made him a cheat and plotter of deception.32 Socrates’ disagreement 
makes Hippias redefine Achilles’ motives: goodwill (εὔνοια)33 induces 
Achilles to change his words depending on the circumstance. On the 
contrary, whenever Odysseus speaks, truly or falsely, he always speaks 
with design (ἐπιβουλεύσας, 371e3). Up to this point, one can discern two 
pairs of terms separated from each other: on the one hand, the pair of 
terms ἑκών-ἐπιβουλὴ and, on the other hand, the pair ἄκων-εὔνοια.
iii. Combining the previous conclusion drawn at the end of section ii, 
namely that “the one who is wise (σοφός) in a particular craft, namely 
good (ἀγαθός) at it, is able (δυνατός) to speak both truly and falsely about 
matters related to it”, and premise ii (“whenever Odysseus speaks, truly 
or falsely, he always speaks with design”), Socrates concludes in favour 
of Odysseus: Odysseus is better (ἀμείνων) than Achilles because those 
who voluntarily speak falsely (οἱ ἑκόντες ψευδόμενοι) were found to be 
better than those who do so involuntarily (ἄκοντες) (371e7–8). Of course, 
those who speak falsely voluntarily, as shown previously, are also able 
to speak truly voluntarily; thus Socrates points once again to the close 
connection between ἑκὼν and knowledge on the one hand, and ἄκων 
and ignorance on the other. Nevertheless, Hippias declares his absolute 
disagreement with the aforementioned conclusion: correlating speak-
ing falsely (ψεύδεσθαι) with doing ill, he deems it unreasonable to believe 
that those who voluntarily do wrong and voluntarily plot to do evils 
(οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες, ἐπιβουλεύσαντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενοι) could be better 
than those who do so involuntarily: wrongs done involuntarily are at-
tributed to ignorance, can be forgiven and can also count as a mitigating 
circumstance, whereas the laws are much more severe towards those 
who do them voluntarily (371e9–372a5). Hippias pushes the discussion 
into a new direction by shifting focus from the realm of crafts to moral 
issues. At first glance, his view on voluntariness (ἑκών) resembles the 
way Socrates treats it. However, there is a considerable difference be-
tween the two views. Hippias interprets ἑκὼν in terms of knowledge ac-
companied by bad intention manifesting itself in plotting evils, while 
ἄκων in terms of ignorance resulting inevitably in doing wrong or con-
32  Cf. ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φῂς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ψεύδεσθαι, 371a2–3; οὕτω γόης καὶ ἐπίβουλος πρὸς τῇ ἀλαζονείᾳ, ὡς 
πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος, 371a3–4; καὶ αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ τεχνάζειν τε καὶ ψεύδεσθαι περιέσεσθαι;, 371d6–7.
33  Reading εὐνοίας in 371e1.
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triving evils. But Socrates, as we have shown above, treats ἑκὼν in terms 
of knowledge defining the will, and activating the power, to produce 
only good things. It only remains to show how what applies to the realm 
of crafts and sciences applies also to the realm of ethics.
Hippias’ passionate belief in the truth of his words is moderated by 
Socrates’ avowal of ignorance, which virtually amounts to a justification of 
his dialectic as knowledge-centred activity aiming at the good.34 Guided 
by the outcome of the previous reasoning, Socrates embraced the view that 
those who harm people and do wrong and speak falsely and deceive and 
err voluntarily are better than those who do so involuntarily. However, in 
professing ignorance, he makes it obvious that he pursues the greatest good 
that the sophist can offer him, his wisdom in the matter in hand, as a cure 
for his soul.35
ONLY THE GOOD MAN ERRS VOLUNTARILY (373c–376c)
Reasoning steps
The last part of the dialogue gives an example of inductive reason-
ing, in which Socrates seeks to find a satisfactory solution to the issue con-
cerning whether those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily 
are better. The various steps of the reasoning process which covers a wide 
range of activities can be classified as follows:
S1–S7 : race and running
S1. One who runs well and successfully (ὁ εὖ θέων) is a good runner (ἀγαθός), 
while one who runs badly (ὁ κακῶς) is a bad one (κακός) (373c9–d2). The 
34  κινδυνεύω ἓν μόνον ἔχειν τοῦτο ἀγαθόν […] τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων ᾗ ἔχει ἔσφαλμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπῃ 
ἐστί […] φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδώς […] καίτοι τί μεῖζον ἀμαθίας τεκμήριον ἢ ἐπειδάν τις σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι διαφέρηται; 
ἓν δὲ τοῦτο θαυμάσιον ἔχω ἀγαθόν, ὅ με σῴζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰσχύνομαι μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ πυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐρωτῶ, 
372b1–c4. Cf. also Apology 38a2, where he says that the greatest good for a human being is to 
converse about virtue.
35  Cf. also Gorgias 458a7, where Socrates counts being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a 
greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is (namely, false belief about 
“the greatest things”, τὰ μέγιστα) than to deliver someone else from it. It is worth noting the bright 
irony found in 373b4–9 (cf. also Friedländer 1964, 142): Socrates accepts Hippias’ accusation that 
he “always makes confusion in arguments, and seems to argue unfairly (ὥσπερ κακουργοῦντι)”, 
however he does so out of ignorance and, therefore, involuntarily; thus he, according to Hippias’ 
account, deserves forgiveness. It seems that Socrates ironically criticizes Hippias’ view on the 
relationship between ἑκὼν and knowledge, with the purpose of establishing his own theory about 
it by shedding light on the deep connection between the two terms.
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term “good” (ἀγαθός) refers to the proper performance of running, as 
well as to its successful outcome.
S2. One who runs fast runs well and successfully, while one who runs 
slowly (ὁ βραδέως θέων) runs badly and unsuccessfully (373d3).
S3. In a race, therefore, and in running, quickness is good (ἀγαθόν) but 
slowness is bad (κακόν) (373d4–5). This means that quickness in run-
ning involves performing the act of running quickly (quickness in 
running process), as well as reaching the destination quickly and first 
(effectiveness).
S4. One who runs slowly voluntarily (ὁ ἑκὼν βραδέως θέων) is a better runner 
(ἀμείνων δρομεύς) than one who does so involuntarily (ὁ ἄκων). Due to S3, 
S4 becomes: one who voluntarily runs slowly, namely badly, is a bet-
ter runner than one who involuntarily runs slowly, namely badly (S4a). 
This view recalls the previous one: the one who is wise in a particular 
craft, namely good at it, is able to speak both truly and falsely about 
matters related to it. But the re-introduction of ἑκὼν into the reasoning 
has an additional role here, namely to remind readers of the crucial dif-
ference between Socrates’ and Hippias’ conceptions of voluntariness 
(ἑκών). In view of this difference, one cannot fail to notice that this rea-
soning amounts to Socrates’ final attempt to convince Hippias of the 
indissoluble connection between ἑκὼν and knowledge directed exclu-
sively to the production of good things. Up to now, both interlocutors 
accept that “one who voluntarily runs slowly, namely badly, is a better 
runner than one who involuntarily runs slowly, namely badly” (S4a) in 
fact means “one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs slowly, 
namely badly, is a better runner than one who involuntarily, namely 
with lack of knowledge, runs slowly, namely badly” (S4b). But in order 
to clarify whether ἑκὼν is to be linked with knowledge accompanied by 
bad intention which manifests itself in contriving and doing evils, or it 
is always inextricably intertwined with knowledge directed to the good, 
we should let Socrates be our guide.
S5. To run is to do something (ποιεῖν) and therefore to perform something 
(ἐργάζεσθαί τι) (373d7–e1). Combining the above premises and the present 
one:
a) A good runner is one who runs well and successfully, namely fast 
(since in running, quickness is good), one who quickly performs 
something in a race; a1) one who voluntarily, namely with knowl-
edge, runs slowly/ runs badly/ performs something in a race is a 
better runner than one who involuntarily, namely with ignorance, 
runs slowly/ runs badly/ performs something in a race. Due to So-
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crates’ delineation of the connection between ἑκὼν and good, (a) is 
transformed into: 
a2) A good runner is one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, 
runs, which means that he runs well and successfully/ runs fast/ 
quickly performs something in a race. The ἑκών-feature of a good 
runner defines whether he will run fast or slowly; in other words, it 
defines the ability to run in one way or the other.
b) A bad runner is one who runs badly, namely slowly (since in run-
ning, slowness is bad), one who slowly performs something in a race. 
And (b) becomes (b1): A bad runner is one who involuntarily, namely 
with ignorance, runs, which means that he runs badly/ runs slowly/ 
slowly performs something in a race. The ἄκων-feature of a bad run-
ner signifies his inability to run in one way or the other.
S6. One who runs badly performs a bad (κακόν) and shameful (αἰσχρόν) 
thing in a race (373e1–2).
S7. After providing a useful reminder of the pairs (of terms) “good-ἑκών” 
and “bad-ἄκων”, Socrates virtually draws the following conclusion:
A good runner is (a) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs, 
which means that he runs well and successfully/ runs fast/ quickly per-
forms something in a race. More specifically, (b) he performs a good and 
admirable thing in a race. The end of the reasoning further clarifies that 
a good runner is (c) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs 
fast or slowly/ voluntarily performs a good and admirable or a bad and 
shameful thing in a race;
A bad runner is (a) one who involuntarily, namely with ignorance, runs, 
which means that he runs badly and unsuccessfully/ runs slowly/ 
slowly performs something in a race. More specifically, (b) he performs 
a bad and shameful thing in a race. The end of the reasoning further 
clarifies that a bad runner is (c) one who involuntarily, namely with ig-
norance, runs fast or slowly/ involuntarily performs a good and admi-
rable or a bad and shameful thing in race.
The conclusion dictates that the main characteristic of the good run-
ner is the voluntary element found in his act of running; this leads to the ef-
fective and admirable performance of the act of running. Besides ensuring 
the characterisation of a runner as good in virtue of the successful result it 
produces, the position of ἑκὼν in the reasoning process plays a twofold role: 
on the one hand, it sheds light on how knowledge before acting,36 proper 
36  Cf. Weiss 1981, 304.
 PLATO’S LESSER HIPPIAS 51
Let. Cláss., São Paulo, n. 16, p. 35-60, 2012
guidance (thanks to knowledge) concerning the performance of the act of 
running and its successful outcome are tightly linked to each other; on the 
other hand, it implies the exclusion of the possibility that the good runner 
will perform a bad and shameful thing in a race, although he has the ability 
– by reason of his knowledge – to do one thing (what is good and admirable) 
or the other (what is bad and shameful). But what prevents him from doing 
a bad and shameful thing in a race? Guided by the knowledge of what is 
good and what is bad in a race, he voluntarily chooses to do only the good.
Moreover, Socrates extends the conclusion drawn from the examina-
tion in the field of race to all aspects of the human process (374a ff.):
a) in wrestling, one who falls down voluntarily, namely one who volun-
tarily performs a bad and shameful thing (since being thrown down in 
wrestling is bad and shameful) is a better wrestler than one who does so 
involuntarily; 
b) in all physical activities, the physically better is able to do both sort 
of things: the strong and the weak, the shameful and the admirable; 
therefore, one who is physically better does what is bad and shame-
ful in respect to the body voluntarily, but one who is worse does them 
involuntarily;
c) furthermore, the better body voluntarily does what is bad and shameful: it 
voluntarily takes shameful and bad postures aiming at its awkwardness; 
d) the better voice sings out of tune voluntarily; 
e) Hippias would choose to possess good things rather than bad ones. It 
should be noted that the reasoning suddenly changes focus and, from 
the various aspects of the human process, proceeds to the question: 
what do people really wish (βούλησις)? Within this framework, the So-
cratic principle that everyone pursues the good (Gorgias 468b) unfolds, 
eventually excluding the alternative option of evil-doing. But let us see 
how this takes place.
f) Hippias would prefer to have feet which limp voluntarily (limping is 
vice of foot) and eyes with which one would see dully and incorrectly 
voluntarily (dull sight is a vice of eyes);
g) with regard to the senses, it is worth having those which voluntarily 
do ill, namely perform their work ineffectively by accomplishing bad 
results, because they are good;
h) those tools with which one voluntarily produces bad results are better 
than those with which one does so involuntarily;
i) with regard to all animals: with an animal better in soul, one would do 
voluntarily the bad works of this soul;
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j) for an archer, it is better to possess a soul which voluntarily misses the 
mark: this soul is better in archery;
k) in every craft and science: a soul which voluntarily performs bad things 
and misses the mark in a particular craft or science is better at this craft 
or science than one which does so involuntarily;
l) with the better slave’s soul, one would voluntarily do the bad works of 
this soul: and this is what one would prefer to have.
Conclusion of the reasoning (application of the above to human 
souls)37: everyone would wish (βούλησις) to have his own soul as good as 
possible; but his soul will be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily.38
The text dictates that each man wishes (βούλησις) what is good, and 
this is directly linked to ἑκὼν and knowledge. In the case of crafts and sci-
ences, the knowledge of what is good and bad defines the will (βούλησις) for 
the good, which activates – under ordinary circumstances, cf. 366c – the 
ability (δύναμις) to achieve it. Under this scope, the possibility that some-
one will wish what is bad and, therefore, activate the ability to achieve it is 
excluded, thanks to the knowledge directed towards the pursuit of good; 
but it is included, when one is deprived of such knowledge – in that case, 
however, he does not act voluntarily (ἑκών). This is true of crafts and sci-
ences, where a set of principles is involved in the production of an object 
or, generally, the accomplishment of an end. But does this also apply to the 
human soul? Socrates’ point is not paradoxical. His view justifies the philo-
sophical life (cf. 372a6–373a8) which represents the true aim of life, namely 
to make one’s soul as good as possible.39 This is done by engaging in dialec-
tical discussion: through elenctic examination, an interlocutor purges the 
false and preserves the true beliefs about ta megista (“the greatest things”). 
By focusing on the knowledge reached through Socratic cross-examination, 
Plato teaches us that, in ethical matters, justice profits the man who pos-
37  Cf. Friedländer 1964, 143. Muhlern (1968, 287) claims that the above premises are employed 
to show that one speaks of a man as being good when his parts and powers are under his control, 
without considering whether the acts he performs are such as one would commend under 
ordinary circumstances. Moreover, he adds that “since a man is good when his powers are under 
his control, and since the soul is one of these powers, a man is good when his soul is under his 
control. Thus it is better to have one’s soul under control and commit evil acts, than not to have 
one’s soul under control and still commit evil acts”. By contrast, my analysis holds that if one has 
his soul under control, as MUHLERN puts it, he will always – as long as it depends on him and he 
is not hindered by disease or other such things inevitably depriving him of his knowledge (cf. 
366c) – perform good acts.
38  Τί δέ; τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν οὐ βουλοίμεθ’ ἂν ὡς βελτίστην ἐκτῆσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν βελτίων ἔσται, ἐὰν 
ἑκοῦσα κακουργῇ τε καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνῃ, ἢ ἐὰν ἄκουσα;, 375c6–d2.
39  Cf. Apology 30b; Gulley 1968, 87, 91–2; Penner 1973, 142, 147–8; Blundell 1992, 161, 164; 
Blondell 2002, 118.
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sesses it: justice is what really benefits his soul.40 This knowledge is not only 
prudential, as it is related to the interest of the soul, but also moral, since 
justice bridges the gap that separates individual from common good: it ben-
efits both agent and patient. To sum up, as regards “the greatest things”, 
the knowledge reached by means of the elenchus, the knowledge of what is 
good and bad,41 must distinguish and characterise the good man and the 
good citizen, eventually ensuring the performance of good and just deeds. 
The presentation of the aforementioned ideas serves as the prelude to the 
examination of the last part of the dialogue, through which the meaning of 
the dialogue will become clearer.
Justice
Hippias bases his rejection of Socrates’ conclusion on the ground-
lessness of the assumption that those who voluntarily do wrong are better 
than those who do so involuntarily, in this way introducing the last treat-
ment of the issue from the point of view of justice (δικαιοσύνη). Socrates’ 
reasoning consists of the following stages (375d7–376b7):
J1. Justice is either some sort of power (δύναμίς τις) or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), 
or both.
J2. If justice is a power of the soul, then the more powerful (δυνατωτέρα) 
soul is the more just (δικαιοτέρα). In fact, they had previously agreed that 
the more powerful soul is the better. At this point, we should recall the 
example of the good runner with which he started:
 A good runner is (a) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs, 
which means that he runs well and successfully/ runs fast/ quickly per-
forms something in a race. More specifically, (b) he performs a good and 
admirable thing in a race. The end of the reasoning further clarifies that 
a good runner is (c) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs 
fast or slowly/ voluntarily performs a good and admirable or a bad and 
shameful thing in a race.
At first glance the element of ἑκὼν makes the agent able (δύναμις) to 
do both. However, the knowledge of what is good activates the will 
(βούλησις) for the good thing and the ability (δύναμις) to acquire it. There-
fore, due to the view “the more powerful soul is the better”, J1 and J2 are 
transformed into the following: if justice is a power of the soul, then the 
more powerful soul = the more just = the better.
40  Cf. Crito 47d-48a; Gorgias 504a-505b, 512a-b; Republic 444c-e; Irwin 1977, 58–9; Blundell 
1992, 161.
41  Cf. O’Brien 1967, 96.
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J3. If justice is knowledge, then the wiser soul (ἡ σοφωτέρα ψυχή) is more just, 
while the more ignorant more unjust.
J4. If justice is both, namely both power and knowledge, then the more 
powerful and wiser soul is more just, while the more ignorant more un-
just. We should note here that, in case justice is both, Socrates does not 
argue that the more ignorant soul is both less powerful and more unjust; 
on the contrary, he only uses the term “more unjust”, presumably aim-
ing at stripping the unjust soul of any sort of power and highlighting 
the importance of knowledge by restoring its value. We saw earlier that 
the knowledge of what is good in a particular craft or science defines the 
will (βούλησις) and the ability (δύναμις) to do it. The possession of such 
knowledge and its practical application aiming at the well-executed 
product of his art are what make a craftsman a good craftsman. Based 
on this analogy, Socrates points to the human soul. When the human, 
guided by the knowledge reached through Socratic cross-examination, 
evaluates something as bad for himself, he will not let it constitute the 
object of his will; although he knows it and is theoretically capable of 
doing it, he will not perform it precisely because he does not wish it.
J5. As has been previously indicated, the more powerful (δυνατωτέρα) and 
wiser (σοφωτέρα) soul is better (ἀμείνων) and more able to do both admira-
ble and shameful things in everything it accomplishes. Therefore, when 
this soul does shameful things, it does them voluntarily, by power and 
craft (διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην), and these things, either one or both of them, 
appear to be attributes of justice too.42 We are left to wonder whether 
Socrates’ words here must be taken cum gruno salis or not. My suggestion 
is that Socrates’ point, though it may seem paradoxical, is clear enough. 
But in order to find the true meaning of his words, we should pay close 
attention to what he actually says. Therefore, the particular emphasis 
placed by Socrates on these two, power and knowledge, and the con-
nection with the above highlight, although it is not explicitly stated, his 
belief that justice is both power and knowledge, or, much better, knowl-
edge and power stemming from knowledge. This view along with the 
one stated above, that the more powerful and wiser soul is better, pro-
motes the reasoning: the more powerful and wiser soul = better = more 
just. Plato implies that, as regards the human soul, justice is good, point-
42  Hoerber (1962, 126 n. 2) believes that the joining of δύναμις with τέχνη is another instance 
of loose terminology; it gives the impression that ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη are synonymous, whereas 
previously Socrates (368b1–2) had indicated a distinction between ἐπιστῆμαι and τέχναι. But this 
does not seem to be the case here. As Weiss (1981, 297 n. 37) puts it, τέχνη substitutes for ἐπιστήμη 
here, cf. Weiss 2006, 135 n. 27.
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ing, at the same time, to the philosophical life: the knowledge of what is 
good for the human soul dictates that we behave justly towards others. 
In analogy to the aforementioned examples, in which it was examined 
in each case what good is (for example, in a race, quickness is good, and 
this is actually what a good runner knows), Socrates’ reasoning here im-
plies that, when it comes to the field of ethics, justice is good, beneficial 
to the human soul; and this is what a good man knows.
J6. To do injustice is to do evils, while not to do injustice is to do admirable 
things. Therefore, what emerges from the reasoning is that, in the case 
of justice, the more powerful and wiser (in justice) soul is better. Before 
moving to J7, let us see what will happen, if we substitute good man for 
good runner or good craftsman/scientist in general, as Socrates actually 
urges us to do. In other words, what effect does Socrates want us to see 
craft analogy as having? A good man (literally, good in justice) is (a) one 
who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, refrains from injustice, which 
means that he does well and successfully/ does not do injustice/ does 
not perform something unjustly. More specifically, (b) he performs a 
good and admirable thing. After further clarifying the analogy: a good 
man is (c) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, refrains from 
injustice or does injustice/ voluntarily performs a good and admirable 
or a bad and shameful thing. So far, the text allows us to draw the above 
parallelism between crafts/sciences and justice. But let us turn back to 
the reasoning and see how it reaches its end point.
J7. The more powerful and better soul (which is the wiser one), when it 
does injustice, will do injustice voluntarily, but the bad soul involuntar-
ily. It should be noted that Socrates leaves the chiasmus incomplete – 
one would expect to find a term denoting inability, such as ἀδυνατωτέρα 
(more powerless, weaker), next to the term “bad” (πονηρά). He seems, 
then, to consider the concept of “power” less significant than (or subser-
vient to) that of “wisdom”.
J8. A good man (ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ) is one who has a good soul (ἀγαθὴ ψυχή), and 
a bad man (κακὸς ἀνήρ) one who has a bad one (κακὴ ψυχή). It is in the na-
ture of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to 
do so involuntarily. Therefore, he who voluntarily errs and does shame-
ful and unjust things, if indeed there is such a man, would be no other 
than the good man. The conclusion seems to stand in contrast to the 
principle attributed to Socrates that “no one errs willingly”.43 How can 
such a prima facie disagreement be justified? 
43  Hoerber (1962, 128 n. 1) observes that the theory is found already in Plato’s Apology (25d–26a) 
and extends to the Laws (731c, 734b, 860d), cf. Meno 77b–78b; Protagoras 345d–e, 358c–d; Republic 
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Scholars, in general, have charged the Lesser Hippias with: (a) weak-
ness in argumentation resting upon craft analogy, and, subsequently, fail-
ure to distinguish between δύναμις and ἕξις; (b) patent equivocation and 
abuses of language. As regards (b), Weiss (1981, 299) and passim has argued 
sufficiently against those who prosecute Plato for his alleged intentional 
(or unintentional) equivocation.44 Therefore, let us elaborate further on (a).
Hoerber (1962, 128, 128 n. 2) observes that the phrase, εἴπερ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος, 
should warn readers not to take seriously the puzzling propositions of the 
treatise.45 Believing that the principal dramatic technique of the dialogue is 
its construction in “doublets”, he goes on to say (at 129) that these “doublets”46
seem to point the reader to a realization that a distinction must be made between two 
separate areas: ethics, on the one hand; and scientific technique or physical prowess, 
on the other. In the latter area, it is true, ἀρετὴ depends primarily, if not exclusively, on 
mental and physical natural ability; in the realm of ethics, however, ἀρετὴ encompasses 
not only training of the intellect, but also voluntary choice.47
Waterfield (1987, 267) notes that the main weakness of the craft anal-
ogy that is relevant to the Lesser Hippias is the following: while a craftsman 
achieves a result, it is 
beyond the province of the craftsman simply qua craftsman to guarantee that the re-
sult is used, by himself or by others, for good or ill. But by definition virtue must be 
used well, so the analogy totters. 
Taylor (1937, 88) had already noticed that knowledge of the good is 
the only knowledge that cannot be put to a wrong use, whereas every other 
kind of knowledge can be abused. Following this line of thought, Blundell 
(1992, 161) says that 
justice remains, however, crucially different from other skills. As a kind of knowledge 
or capacity it has its own internal goals like any other craft. But unlike other skills, it 
cannot be used “badly” for immoral goals outside its own sphere of activity, since its 
internal goals are precisely those of morality.48
589c; Timaeus 86d–e; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.2.1172b35–1173a5; Proclus, In Rempublicam 
2.355. For the parallel between the Lesser Hippias and Xenophon’s Memorabilia (4.2), see Calogero 
1948, xii n. 2; Guthrie 1975, 197; Weiss 1981, 304 n. 55; Waterfield 1987, 269; Phillips 1989, 370; 
Weiss 2006, 136 n. 30.
44  See, for example, Sprague 1962, 74; Muhlern 1968, 288.
45  See also Taylor 1937, 87; Weiss 1981, 287 n. 2. For further discussions of the meaning of the 
phrase, see Sprague 1962, 76; O’Brien 1967, 104; Penner 1973, 140–1; Guthrie 1975, 197–8; Irwin 
1977, 77; Müller 1979, 65, 74–5; Lampert 2002, 252–3; Weiss 2006, 140.
46  Cf. O’Brien 1967, 103 n. 12.
47  Cf. Friedländer 1964, 326 n. 3.
48  See also Gould 1955, 43–5; O’Brien 1967, 103 and 106; Gulley 1968, 16, 85–7; Irwin 1977, 77–
9; Zembaty 1989, 62–3; Vlastos 1991, 279; Allen 1996, 29; Kahn 1996, 117; Van Ackeren 2003, 54 ff.
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Moreover, let us also quote Vlastos’s (1991, 279) view:
[…] no reason to believe that when Plato wrote this dialogue he had himself spot-
ted the root of trouble. What he would need for this purpose would be to identify the 
difference between the sense of “better” which is so conspicuous in this dialogue, 
the morally neutral sense of superior executive power or skill, on one hand, and that 
centrally and uniquely moral sense of superior character or disposition […] This was to 
await Aristotle’s clearer vision, which empowered him to discern how wrong it would 
be to define moral virtue as a power or craft, for power or craft could be used for either 
good or evil […] Aristotle enriched the vocabulary of moral analysis by introducing 
the word ἕξις to designate the state of character which choose to exercise power for the 
right ends and resolutely declines to exercise it for the wrong ends.
Nevertheless, Socrates’ use of craft analogy in the Lesser Hippias is 
designed to help us focus on good craftsman, not on craftsman in general. 
In the case of a good craftsman, a type of knowledge pertaining to a par-
ticular craft is possessed by a particular craftsman; this craftsman knows 
what he is doing and can give an account of what is good and bad in his 
craft. The knowledge of what is good in a particular craft defines the will 
(βούλησις) and the ability (δύναμις) to do the good, since it is directed towards 
it. In this case, the craftsman acts voluntarily (ἑκών). But there are times 
when he is hindered by disease or that sort of thing (cf. 366c), thereby act-
ing involuntarily. At any rate, it is only when he is guided by the knowledge 
of what is good in his craft and, thereby, produces a good-beneficial prod-
uct that a craftsman can be a good craftsman.
This analogy gives Socrates an occasion to turn to the human soul: 
the more powerful, wiser, better and more just soul, the good soul of the 
good man, errs and does shameful and unjust things voluntarily. But the 
conclusion reached is at the same time invalidated. The knowledge of what 
is good for the soul, namely justice, defines the will (βούλησις) and the power 
(δύναμις) to do only the good, thus deactivating the power to do shameful 
and unjust things.49 In this case, a man acts voluntarily (ἑκών); but when he 
is deprived of such knowledge (cf. Protagoras 345b2–5),50 he acts involuntar-
ily. The analogy gradually reaches its peak: at any rate, it is only when he 
is guided by the knowledge of what is good for his soul and, thereby, pro-
duces good things that a man can be a good man. Plato does not need to 
distinguish between δύναμις and ἕξις, since δύναμις itself, being subordinate 
to the knowledge of what is good, is activated or deactivated depending on 
whether the agent is guided by or deprived of such knowledge.
49  Cf. Friedländer 1964, 143–4; Balaban 2008.
50  οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ’ ἄν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ 
ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος – αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι – (“In the same way the 
good man could on occasion also become bad, due to time or hardship or disease or some other 
accident – for this is the only bad practice, to be deprived of knowledge”).
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However, in what way this knowledge is to be attained by human 
beings? Despite Hippias’ final rejection of Socrates’ view and the latter’s 
profession of ignorance, the dialogue comes to a final and definite conclu-
sion. It invalidates Hippias’ apparent expertise in Homer, indicating his ig-
norance about the subject at issue. Besides stripping Hippias of his apparent 
wisdom, Plato turns his criticism towards traditional forms of education 
and their heirs, raising the question of what kinds of people they actually 
produce. The main problem lies in the fact that the traditional moral stand-
ards or values disseminated through the study of Homer are in fact uncriti-
cally accepted as desirable in themselves. They have binding force for those 
by whom they are accepted, but they are not accepted critically. Plato’s criti-
cism targets traditional values through their representative, underscoring 
his unreflective endorsement of them. Nevertheless, there is a solution to 
the problem, a way out of the impasse; and this solution is deeply related to 
the individual character of the interlocutor. One must step back, question 
and reflect on the moral beliefs he holds. Engaging in elenctic examination, 
the human gets rid of the false and keeps the right beliefs about what is 
good-beneficial to his soul and what is bad. Through the elenchus, which 
benefits both agent and patient (cf. Gorgias 458a–b), the human realizes that 
justice is what really benefits his soul. But justice in turn benefits both agent 
and patient, since it bridges the gap separating individual from common 
good. Plato justifies the philosophical life on the grounds that it is the only 
way of life worth living (cf. Apology 38a), aiming at making one’s soul as 
good as possible. Thus it is entirely on the basis of this analogy from the 
crafts and the subsequent deactivation of wrongdoing that Socrates estab-
lishes the superiority of justice over injustice and the significance of the 
former for the human soul: caring for one’s soul involves caring for justice.
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Abstract. A basic question still confronting readers of Plato’s Lesser Hippias is how to 
deal with the final conclusion of the dialogue, namely that the good man does injus-
tice voluntarily, which seems profoundly irreconcilable with the principle attributed to 
Socrates that “no one errs willingly”. Nevertheless, if one delves deeper into the text, 
one will uncover further clues indicating that Socrates’ point is neither paradoxical nor 
contradictory to the philosophical positions he sets forth in Plato’s other works. On 
the contrary, the dialogue comes to a definite conclusion. The just man refrains from 
doing injustice precisely because he does not wish (βούλεσθαι) to do it. The knowledge 
of what is good and bad, namely of what benefits and harms the soul, activates exclu-
sively the will for the good and, subsequently, the power to produce it.
Keywords. Plato; Socrates; knowledge of good and bad; justice; will; power.
